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NOTES
PROCESS, PRIVACY, AND. THE SUPREME COURT
In its 1986 term, the United States Supreme Court handed down a 5 to 4 decision
which refused to protect the private sexual practices of consenting male homosexuals.
In Bowers v. Hardwick,' the Court reversed an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals deckion 2
which struck down a Georgia statute prohibiting sodomy.' The appeals court had rea-
soned that the Constitution prevents the states from interfering in certain individual
decisions critical to a person's personal autonomy. 4 Because such decisions are essentially
private, the court reasoned, they were beyond the reach of governmental interference
in a civilized society." In reversing, the Supreme Court held that the right of privacy and
its attendant protections applied only to the area of family, marriage, or procreation, 6
and thereby distinguished and refused to recognize what it referred to as the "claimed
constitutional right -of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy . ..." 7
The right of privacy has no textual basis in the United States Constitution. Some
courts, however, have recognized it as a natural rights having constitutional impor-
I 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). Chief Justice Burger, and Justices O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, and
White found in the majority. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Stevens, and Marshall comprised the
minority. Originally, Justice Powell voted in Hardwick's favor. With the Powell vote, Justice Black-
mun would have written the majority opinion. Boston Globe, July 13, 1986, at 2, col. 3.
2 Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985), reu'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
The Georgia sodomy statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment
for not less than one year nor more than 20 years.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1211.
6 Id.
6 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
7 Id. See infra notes 222 and 232 and accompanying text for Justice Blackmun's response to
this characterization.
8 Blackstone wrote, "when the Maker] created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct
himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, ... and gave him
also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*39-40. These rules are implicitly correct, Blackstone continued, because they are the product of
the Creator's wisdom. Id. at *40. Natural laws, he concluded, are reflected in the perfection of
God's plan and enacted positive laws must necessarily conform with their antecedents in natural
law; "[t]hese are the eternal immutable laws of good and evil, to which the Creator himself, in all
his dispensations, conforms .... Such, among others, are these principles: that we should live
honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to everyone his due . . . ." Id.
Justice and the taws of nature are so "inseparably interwoven," Blackstone noted, that the
former cannot be attained except by observing the latter. Id. Thus, in Blackstone's view, natural law
and ethics are synonymous, and observation of the legal system demonstrates that acts that enrich
one's happiness are invariably legal, while actions destructive of one's happiness are forbidden. Id,
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tance. 9
 Originally enunciated in a famous nineteenth century law review article by
Professors Warren and Brandeis, 19 the judiciary has fashioned privacy rights in a variety
of situations and circumstances.
initially, the privacy right served as a basis for providing a cause of action in tort
cases in which, typically, a person's likeness was used without permission for packaging
or advertisement purposes." This novel cause of action arose at the turn of the century
as the technology of photography made a new type of personal invasion possible. The
courts were required to make common law without preeedent.' 2 Because these were
generally cases of first impression the courts searched for a policy with which they could
apply existing law in a new area." Adjudicating novel litigation requires a reasoned
development of existing legal doctrine."
More recently, the Court made novel application of existing law in the 1965 case of
Griswold v. Connecticul.' 5 The Supreme Court found unconstitutional a Connecticut stat-
ute which prohibited dissemination of contraceptive drugs or devices. 16 It reasoned that
the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, or emanations, which create
zones of privacy 17 and held that the Constitution guaranteed a married couple the right
to make contraceptive decisions without state interference. 18 Evidently the Court rec-
at *41. Not surprisingly, Blackstone's tenets are controversial. See, e.g., Dworkin, "Natural" Law
Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982). Professor Dworkin comments, "[n]atural law insists that
what the law is depends in some way on what the law should be." Id. at 165.
9 See Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human
Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 958
-64 (1979).
10 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) [hereinafter Warren
and Brandeis].
11 See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
12 The Warren and Brandeis article begins with an epigraph: "It could be done only on
principles of private justice, moral fitness, and public convenience, which when applied to a new
subject, make common law without a precedent; much more when received and approved by
usage." Warren and Brandeis, supra note 10, at 193 (citing Justice Willes in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr.
2303, 2312 (1769)).
1 " See generally HART AND SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS — BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW, 421-77 (tent. ed. 1958) [hereinafter HART AND SAcKsJ.
14 See id. at 469 (excerpting Warren and Brandeis, supra note 10). It is not clear what directs
judicial reasoning when precedent is lacking. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (an
unpublished paper presented by Lon L. Fuller at Harvard University on Nov. 19, 1957) (excerpted
in HART AND SACKS, supra note 13, at 421). Professor Fuller addressed the question of whether a
decision had to be reached by applying a previously established rule or standard. Id. Fuller stated
that for a decision to be rational it must be based on some rule, principle, or standard. Id, The
principle need not necessarily be expressed in existing case law, however. Fuller recognized suc-
cessful adjudication in cases where there appeared to be no previously established rules. Id. at 421-
22. Furthermore, he formulated what is the courts' claim to acceptance in these emerging areas of
law with no exact jurisprudential antecedent. Id. at 422. According to Fuller, although the decision
must imply some standard or principle, it need not be one that was established before the case
came to bar. Id. at 423. The justness of the newly articulated rule, although unfamiliar, will be
recognized in a new situation if it is rationally derived from a principle indicative of shared purpose
in the society. Id. at 424. New law, to be well received, must not seem to be the product of arbitrary
judicial fiat, but the product of reasoning. Id. at 425. According to Professor Fuller, "the efficacy
of adjudication depends upon a faith in its essential rationality." Id.
15 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
IS Id. at 485.
" Id. at 484.
1 " Id. at 485. The Court stated that "[t]he present case, then, concerns a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Id.
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ognized that in holding the statute unconstitutional it was performing what some might
consider a legislative function, and disclaimed the notion by stating, "He do not sit as
a super-legislature ...."L 9 The disclaimer notwithstanding, however, twenty-two years
later in Bowers v. Hardwick — the most recent Supreme Court case to construe privacy
rights — the specter of judicial legislation is still present. As the majority wrote, "[t]he
Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-
made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of
the Constitution." 20
This note will show how the privacy right first entered the legal language at the
turn of,the century. It will then outline how modern courts "found" the constitutional
right of privacy in the mid-1960's and the treatment the right received in the succeeding
quarter century. This framework will serve as a basis for examining the reasoning in Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond," Baker v. Wade,'" Dronenburg v. Zech, 23 and Hard-
wick v. Bowers," four lower court cases in which gay men challenged the constitutionality
of laws proscribing homosexual rights. 25 The next section will examine Bowers v, Hard-
wick, 2" a Supreme Court case which construed the right of privacy as it pertains to
homosexual activity, and illustrate why the majority opinion's logic is flawed." The note
will demonstrate how the majority misperceived the true nature of the privacy right and
will compare the different claims to acceptance that a court and legislature have in
establishing a new right. Finally, the note will analyze why it was within the Court's
legitimate purview to develop the privacy right through a reasoned elaboration of'
principle.
1. Evourriorq or THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The starting point for any examination of privacy rights is the 1890 Harvard Law
Review article written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. 21 In response to the
invention of photography which created a new threat to personal privacy, 29 the authors
attempted to demonstrate how the law must evolve to secure for the individual the right
to be let alone. 0 At the outset, the authors postulated that new laws are merely mani-
1 9 Id. at 482.
2" 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986).
21 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
22 553 F. Stipp. 1121 (N.D. Texas 1982).
23 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
24 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).
25 See infra notes 127-200 and accompanying text for a discuSsion of the lower court cases.
'?" 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
° See infra notes 201-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court case.
" Warren and Brandeis, supra note 10.
2"Id, at 195.
3"Id. At the turn or the century, the New York Court or Appeals addressed and rejected a
right of privacy claim when Abigail Roberson asked if an individual had a cause of action for the
unauthorized commercial use of her likeness. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y.
538, 556, 64 N.E. 442, 447 (1902). A flour manufacturer expropriated the likeness without Rob-
erson's knowledge or consent, and used it in an advertisement. Id. at 542, 64 N.E. at 442. The
plaintiff asked that the court enjoin the defendant company FrOm further circulating the likeness,
Id. at 543, 64 N.E. at 442.	 -
The defendant asserted that the plaintiff's complaint stated "no cause of action known to the
common law, either in law or in equity." Id. at 539, 64 N.E. at 442. The court agreed, finding that
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festations of preexisting common law rights to protection, 3 ' and that political, social, and
economic changes frequently require the courts to redefine the exact nature and extent
of such protection. 32
Warren and Brandeis explained that although the law initially served only to protect
explicit forms of property such as land or livestock," later there came a recognition that
the law might also protect a person's spiritual nature, sensibility and intellect." As the
scope of legal rights broadened, the constitutional guarantees of life, liberty, and
property" took on new meanings." Warren and Brandeis reasoned that this "recognition
of the legal value of sensations" explained much of the development of the common
law." For instance, the law of assault developed out of the law of battery: the courts
recognized that not only should people be protected from physical injury, but also they
should be protected from fear of such injury. 38 As society evolved and recognized the
importance of human emotion, the law responded by expanding its notion of what
constituted a legally protectable interest. 39 The law of slander and libel developed, for
example, when the courts recognized that a person's reputation and standing in the
community were worthy of legal protection. 1 °
Summarizing the development of common law, Warren and Brandeis concluded:
This development of the law was inevitable. The intense intellectual and
emotional life, and the heightening of sensations which came with the ad-
no precedent existed for this type of action. Id. at 543-44, 64 N.E. at 443. The court reviewed the
authorities upon which the "right of privacy" was said to rest and concluded that all those authorities
were rooted in property or contract law. Id. at 555, 64 N.E. at 447. Because Roberson's claim
implicated neither of these areas, however, the court found no cause or action. The court held
simply that Abigail Roberson had suffered an unredressable wrong. Id. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447.
A dissenting judge argued that existing legal principles should have been interpreted to provide
Roberson with a right of action, Id. at 560-66, 64 N.E, at 449-51 (Gray, J., dissenting). Analogizing
from property law, he observed that the common law had always recognized the inviolate nature
of property and the person. Id. at 561, 64 N.E. at 449 (Gray, j., dissenting). His opinion argued
that the absence of exact precedent, therefore, was of no material importance. Id. (Gray, J.,
dissenting). The dissent recognized that social evolution, and the development of new technologies,
created conditions which the rigid application of the common law could not adequately meet. Id.
(Gray, J., dissenting). Furthermore, it recognized that judicial law was dynamic in nature and
regarded equity as the agency which brought law and society into harmony. Id. at 562, 64 N.E. at
449 (Gray, J., dissenting).
31
 Warren and Brandeis, supra note 10, at 193.
32 Id.
33
34 Id.
' 5 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Warren and Brandeis, supra note 10. at 193. According to the authors, "now the right to life
has come to mean the right to enjoy life, — the right to be let alone; the right to liberty secures
the exercise of' extensive civil privileges; and the term 'property' has grown to comprise every form
of possession — intangible as well as tangible." Id.
37 Id.
33 Id. at 193-94.
3"Id, at 194.
4"Id. The authors also chronicle a similar evolution in the law of property:
Similar to the expansion of the right to life was the growth of the legal conception of
property. From corporeal property arose the incorporeal rights issuing out of it; and
then there opened the wide realm of intangible property, in the products and processes
of the mind, as works of literature and art, goodwill, trade secrets, and trademarks.
Id. at 194-95 (citations omitted),
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vance of civilization, made it clear to men that only a part of the pain,
pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things. Thoughts, emotions, and
sensations demanded legal recognition, and the beautiful capacity for growth
which characterizes the common law enabled the judges to afford the req-
uisite protection, without the interposition of the legislature."
By subrogating the importance of actual laws to the underlying legal principles which
require a body of laws to exist, the authors suggested that new claims — irrespective of
their exact nature — should be recognized as novel manifestations of preexisting claims:
ones which have always existed and which arose from each person's need for protection
in our society."
When faced with a newly claimed right, judicial reasoning is the acceptable method
through which courts apply old law to new claims." Through a process of deliberation,
courts tap into the underlying right seeking protection. The legal system is not based
upon the blind application of established rules to specific cases.44 Rather, the common
law is a process of applying known rules to newly made claims through a reasoned
elaboration of principle."
The evolution of privacy rights exemplifies the reasoned extension of law." The
Court implicitly recognized a right of privacy in early cases, specifically in the areas of
child rearing and education, which the Court viewed as falling within a "private realm
of family life."47 In the 1923 case of Meyer a. Nebraska," the Court, objecting to the state's
" Id. at 195.
^2 Id. at 213.
4 ' See generally LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO ILEGM, REASONING 1-8 (1948).
" Id. Dean Levi notes that "[i]t is important that the mechanism of legal reasoning should not
be concealed by its pretense. The pretense is that the law is a system of known rules applied by a
judge ... ." Id. at 1.
0 Id, at 2-3. Dean Levi claims that judicial reasoning is essentially a process rooted in the
doctrine of precedent. Id. at 1-2. Rules established in earlier cases are applied to similar situations
as they arise. Id. at 2. The dynamic quality of the law, however, requires that the application be
somewhat imperfect. Factually duplicative cases rarely arise; similar cases that are parallel, however,
do. Id. The scope of the prior rule may be wide enough to have legitimate application, and it is the
finding of similarities or differences between cases that is the crucial step in the process of legal
reasoning. Id. In this manner, cases that seem different may be treated as though they are the
same: "A working legal system must ... be willing to pick out key similarities and to reason from
them to the justice of applying a common classification." Id. The classification may, by necessity,
change from time to time, but it does so in an orderly and organized fashion through the reasoned
elaboration of principle. Id. at 4. Levi explains that this change occurs not only as novel legal
situations are presented, but additionally, as society's expectations change. Id. The classifications
most remain somewhat ambiguous in order to permit the infusion of new ideas. Id. Levi labels this
a "moving classification system." Id.
46 In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court provided a right of
legal access to contraception based on a reasoned elaboration of the right of privacy. The case
opened the courts to litigation over constitutional protection of privacy rights. See generally Note,
On Privacy: Constitutional Protection For Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670 (1973). The Griswold
plaintiffs implicitly claimed a right of sexual autonomy — a claim never asserted previously, at least
not directly. Critics of the Griswold decision attacked the "newly" found constitutional right to
privacy as a subjective expression of judicial ideology. Richards, supra note 9, at 957. The Supreme
Court, however, carefully cited related case law when it sustained the privacy right. Griswold, 381
U.S. at 482-85. The Court, therefore, had not exactly fabricated a right out of thin air, but tapped
the underlying principles of earlier cases.
47 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 321 U.S. 158,166 (1944).
48 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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intrusion into private family matters, struck down a statute which prohibited teaching
foreign languages to children under a certain age. 49 Although the state had an interest
in fostering patriotism among its young, apparently furthered by proscribing use of
foreign languages, the Court held that the state's interest was overridden by a parent's
right to chart the course of his or her child's education. 5° Similarly, two years later, in
Pierce v. Society of Sisiers, 51
 the Court invalidated an Oregon state law which required
parents to send their children to public rather than parochial schools. 52 Recognizing the
private nature of religious choices, the Court found the law an impermissible intrusion
upon the parents' right to choose where to educate their children."
In sum, although the Court may have been without precedent when called on in
1961 to decide Poe v. U1lman, 54 a case regarding legal access to contraceptives, it was not
without related cases from which privacy rights could be inferred. 55 The divided Court,
however, declined to address the plaintiff's claim and found the case nonjusticiable."
Poe, therefore, is most noteworthy for its dissenting opinions. 57 In dissent, Justice Douglas
wrote that the Poe petitioner's fourteenth amendment rights had been abridged." In
language reminiscent of the Warren and Brandeis article," Justice Douglas wrote that
the claim should have been adjudicated because social evolution often puts community
issues in a new perspective and exposes new needs which must be addressed." Justice
Douglas stated that the Connecticut law intruded upon the most personal sanctum of
the home and invaded the privacy implicit in a free society. 6 ' He concluded that the
notion of privacy was not unfounded; rather it "emanated" from the Constitution,"
Unlike the Douglas dissent, which focused on the extent to which the state legiti-
mately might regulate private behavior, justice Harlan stressed the quintessential privacy
implicit in the marital relationship." Justice Harlan found repugnant an intrusion of
the criminal justice system into the very heart of marital privacy, especially in light of
the state's acknowledgment of the sanctity of marriage. 64 Justice Harlan, however, ex-
plicitly stated that the right of privacy was not absolute and distinguished some sexual
misconduct as appropriately subject to criminal inquiry no matter how privately prac-
ticed."
0 Id. at 403.
50 Id. at 401.
" 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
52 Id. at 530,534-35.
'3 Id.
54 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
" See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text for examples of earlier privacy cases the Court
cited.
"Poe, 367 U.S. at 508-09.
"Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan, and Stewart dissented.
58 Poe, 367 U.S at 515 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
59 See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text for discussion of the article.
5° Poe, 367 U.S. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"Id. (citations omitted). Justice Douglas's use of the word "emanation" is noteworthy because
it appears again in the penumbra theory he articulated in Griswold five years later. See infra notes
70-71 and accompanying text for the language of the Griswold opinion.
65 Poe, 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65 Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan stated that laidultery, homosexuality and the like
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The majority of the Court in Poe v. Ullman did not address the substantive consti-
tutional questions presented. Therefore, the underlying question of whether personal
autonomy in the realm of private sexual relations should receive constitutional protection
remained unanswered." Within five years, however, the same issues confronted the
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.° Here, the directors of Connecticut's Planned Parent-
, hood League were convicted of providing married persons with contraceptive infor-
mation and devices in violation of state law." This time, with Justice Douglas writing for
the majority, the Court held that the Connecticut statute violated rights implicit in the
Constitution." Justice Douglas found constitutional support for the decision in the first,
third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments." The Court concluded that the "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance." 7 ' The Court thus gave explicit
recognition to a constitutional right of privacy.'"
Justice Goldberg wrote a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan." He found that the language and history of the ninth amendment
supported the right of marital privacy, although the Constitution mentioned no such
right explicitly. 74 Justice Goldberg asserted that Justice Stewart's dissenting argument
that no general right of privacy could be found in the Constitution 75 was disingenuous
because the Court had never previously held that only rights specifically mentioned in
the Constitution were protected."
From the legislative history of the ninth amendment," Justice Goldberg found
support from James Madison, the amendment's author, for the concept that the Con-
stitution secures unenumerated rights against government interference." justice Gold-
berg wrote that to hold that marital privacy may be infringed merely because such a
right is not explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution ignores the purpose of the ninth
arc sexual intimacies which the State forbids altogether, but the intimacy of husband and wife is
necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage . ..." Id. at 553 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Harlan presumably distinguishes laldultery, homosexuality and the
like" from sexual intimacy between husband and wife because the enumerated "crimes" are not an
extension of marital intimacy. See infra notes 127-251 and accompanying text for a discussion of
court's treatment of homosexuals' privacy claims.
Ludd, The Aftermath of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney: In Search of the Right to Be Let Alone,
10 U, DAY-roN L. REV. 705,721 (1985) [hereinafter Ludd].
u7 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" Id. at 480.
69 Id. at 481-86.
70 Id .
 at 484. Justice Douglas reiterated that the third amendment prohibits peacetime quarter-
ing of soldiers; the fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures; the fifth
amendment protects against self-incrimination; and the ninth amendment reserves to the people
rights not otherwise enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Id.
7j Id,
72 Id. at 485. The Court stated "[t]hese cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses
for recognition here is a legitimate one." Id.
73 Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
74 Id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
76 Id. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 486 n.1 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
" Id. at 988-91 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
76 Id. at 489 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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amendment. 79 In analysis similar to the Harlan dissent in Poe,"Justice Goldberg con-
cluded by distinguishing the guarantee of liberty implicit in marital privacy from the
"State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct."" The Court, therefore,
recognized a qualified right of privacy which allowed individuals to make some personal
decisions without state interference.
Although in Griswold the Supreme Court finally recognized the right of sexual
privacy as worthy of constitutional protection, the Court limited that right to decisions
within the confines of the traditional marriage relationship. This changed in 1972 when
the Court, again under the ambit of privacy, used equal protection analysis to extend
the right of contraceptive freedom to unmarried persons. 82 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the
Court characterized the Griswold privacy right in far more expansive terms. Noting that
the rule in Griswold nominally applied to a married couple, Justice Brennan stated that
a couple was comprised of two autonomous persons." He saw the right of privacy as
the right of the individual, whether married or single, to be free from impermissible
governmental intrusion. 84
Thus, what had been recognized initially as a marital right, the Eisenstadt Court now
extended to others. The Court specifically discredited the artificially narrow holding in
Griswold which allowed privacy rights for married individuals but left those who were
unmarried without constitutional (or contraceptive) protection." Eisenstadt also signaled
the Court's willingness to use an additional constitutional mechanism when protecting
personal autonomy: the Equal Protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."
Against this background of a broadening view of personal privacy rights and an
emerging willingness to apply equal protection analysis to cases relating to sexual
relations" the Court decided Roe v. Wade." In Roe, a pregnant single woman brought a
class action challenging the constitutionality of a Texas law which proscribed abortion
except with a doctor's permission for the purpose of saving the mother's life. 89
 The
" Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg specifically stated:
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as
the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed
in so many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the
Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever.
Id.
8° Poe, 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Justice Harlan's dissent.
51 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
85 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972).
85
 Id, at 453.
54 Id. (emphasis in original). The Court stated,
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual
and emotional make up. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
Id. (emphasis in original).
ss Ludd, supra note 66, at 725.
5° Id.
" Id.
" 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
as Id. at 118.
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Court held the statute unconstitutional by a 7 to 2 vote. Writing for the majority, Justice
Blackmun noted that although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of
privacy," in past decisions the Court had recognized a constitutional dimension to privacy
rights. 9 ' Constitutional protection extended to those personal rights the Court deemed
"'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. -92 Within this arena, Justice
Blackmun wrote, was a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy." He
noted that the right of privacy was not absolute and reasoned that the woman's privacy
right diminished in constitutionally significant proportion to the increasing medical
likelihood of the fetus's viability. 95 The opinion concluded that the right of personal
privacy included the abortion decision, but that consideration of important state regu-
latory interests qualified the right. 96
In 1977, the Court addressed the rights of minors to make procreational decisions.
Carey v. Population Services Internationalo invalidated a New York statute forbidding the
sale of contraception to minors. The Court concluded that while it had not yet enunciated
the outer limits of the privacy right,98 procreative decisions were the essence of, consti-
tutionally protected choices. 99 In a footnote, Justice Brennan stated that the Court had
not yet determined what limits, if any, a state may put on consensual sexual behavior
between adults.'" Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion,lui responded to the Brennan
footnote by observing that the Court need not rule on the validity of every statute dealing
with consensual sexual behavior before establishing that certain consensual acts were
prohibited.'"
9° Id. at 152.
91 Id. The Court observed that "the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Id.
92 Id. (quoting Niko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
93 Id. at 153.
"Id. at 154.
95 1d. at 162-64. See Ludd, supra note 66, at 726.
96 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. In Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mivsouri v. Danforth, the Court bolstered
the woman's right to snake this personal decision by holding that "the State may not constitutionally
require the consent of the spouse ... as a condition for abortion during the first 12 weeks of
pregnancy." 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976). The Court further noted, "the State may not impose a blanket
provision . requiring the consent of a parent .... as a condition for abortion of an unmarried
minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy." Id. at 74.
97 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
98 Id. at 684.
• 99 Id. at 685. Carey is a plurality decision. A handy table of the various holdings — and the
justices joining in those holdings — may be found in Note, Hardwick v, Bowers: An Attempt to Pull
the Meaning of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney Out of the Closet, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973, 990
n.103 (1985).
100 Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 n.17. Justice Brennan noted, "the Court has not definitively answered
the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating
[private consensual sexual behavior] among adults." Id.
101 Id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In dissent, Justice Rehnquist speculated how "[t]hose
who valiantly defended ... Bunker Hill in 1775" might react to "the right of commercial
vendors ... to peddle [contraceptives] to unmarried minors through ... vending machines located
in the mens' rooms of truck stops .. ." Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102 Id, at 718 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist contended, "[w]hile we have not
ruled on every conceivable regulation affecting such conduct the facial constitutional validity of
criminal statutes prohibiting certain consensual acts has been definitely established." Id. (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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Although not directly in the line of contraception cases (generally referred to as
Griswold and' its progeny!) two related cases decided in the same period are extremely
important to the development of privacy rights. In the 1969 case of Loving v. Common-
wealth of Virginia 103 the Court addressed the marital privacy question from a slightly
different perspective. The issue in Loving was the constitutionality of a state anti-misce-
genation statute 1°4
 previously upheld by the Virginia courts." In reversing, the Supreme
Court employed analysis familiar from the Griswold opinions.'°° The Court noted that
although marriage traditionally had been subject to state regulation without federal
intervention, states did not have unlimited power to regulate marriage. 107
In characterizing the freedom to marry as an essential personal right, the Court
recognized once again that marital decisions are fundamental to individual existence and
survival.'" It concluded that the decision to marry a person of another race was an
individual one, and the state could not infringe that right."
In 1969, the Court addressed a tangential, yet related, privacy issue. Stanley v.
Georgia"° questioned whether a state obscenity statute was unconstitutional insofar as it
punished mere private possession of Obscene matter. The case arose when law enforce-
ment agents searched the defendant's home for evidence of a bookmaking operation." '
In the course of the search the police discovered obscene films." 2 Stanley was charged
with possession of obscene matter in violation of Georgia law!" and convicted." 4 In
reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that under the Constitution, states
103
 388 U.S. I (1967).
' 0.,
 The Virginia Code stated: "If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any
colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished
by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than five years." VA. Corm
ANN. 20-59 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
1 °5 Loving, 388 U.S. at 3. The Court cited the unpublished trial court's language:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed
them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there
would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that
he did not intend for the races to mix.
Id.
1 °6 See supra notes 66-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Griswold opinions.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. The Loving Court found that
While the state court is no doubt correct in asserting that marriage is a social relation
subject to the State's police power ... the State does not contend in its argument
before this Court that its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding
the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could it do so in light of Meyer v.
Nebraska ... and Skinner v. Oklahoma.
Id. (citations omitted).
1°8 1d. at 12.
10° Id. See also, W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION 233-34 (1983).
The authors assert that Loving functions "to signal potential changes in the law of marriage. These
changes favor the increased autonomy of the parties and the decline of State involvement in
marriage Compared to these fundamental questions, the problem of interracial marriage that
gave rise to Loving appears to be of less significance." Id.
"o 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
111 /d. at 558.
" 2 Id.
"3 The Georgia Code makes knowing possession of obscene matter a felony punishable by
incarceration for one to five years. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968).
'" Stanley, 394 U.S. at 559.
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could not make private possession of obscene matter crimina1. 115 Although recognizing
that the first amendment evinces a valid governmental interest in dealing with the
problem of obscenity, 116 the Court nonetheless held that the state's interest was neither
absolute nor, in every context, could it be insulated from constitutional inquiry." 7 In
recognizing this distinction, the Court limited its prior rulings — generally dealing with
manufacture or distribution of pornographylls — and placed private possession of
obscene materials beyond the state's reach. 119 Again, as in Loving, the Court's reasoning
emphasized fundamental rights and freedoms. 12° Citing Griswold and Society of Sisters as
cases which stood for the constitutional right of individuals to receive information,m the
Court stated that the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their perceived
social worth, was fundamental in our society. 122 Furthermore, this right took on an
"added dimension" in the privacy of a person's home.'" The Court characterized that
right as the fundamental right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
one's privacy and held that in only very limited circumstances could a state or federal
government compromise it. 124
The decisions in Griswold and related cases established the constitutional right of
privacy. As a judicially-created right with no textual basis in the Constitution, however,
the scope of the right remained unclear. 121 The courts could interpret the line of privacy
cases as restricting the right of privacy to family-based decisions; alternatively, courts
might. interpret the cases as expanding the right of privacy to protect individual auton-
omy. 12"
II. PRIVACY RIGHTS AND HOMOSEXUAL. Ac rivrry
A. Lower Court Cases
The constitutional right of privacy as initially conceived by the Court was rooted in,
and limited to, the marital relationship. 127 Although extended in some cases to unmarried
10 Id.
11 " Id. at 563.
" 7 Id.
ir" See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1967) (sustaining statute which makes punish-
able the mailing of obscene material).
"9 Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
L29 Id. at 564-66.
121 Id. at 564.
,52 Id.
125 Id.
I24 Id. The Stanley Court concluded,
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regarding obscenity, we do not
think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a Man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.
Id. at 565,
125 Survey, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 521, 563 (1986).
125 Id.
127
	 supra notes 67-81 and accompanying text for references to the initial cases which
construed the constitutional right of privacy.
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individuals as well," it was unclear whether the protected rights extended to reach
private consensual activity between homosexual adults. The lower courts confronted this
controversy on a number of occasions and in a number of jurisdictions, with disparate
results. Applying a right founded in one set of factual circumstances (marital sexuality)
to a related but somewhat different area (homosexuality) demonstrates how courts
struggle to determine the breadth and reach of prior case law.
Among the earliest cases to address the extent to which privacy rights reached
homosexual activity was Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond. 129 The case
is noteworthy both for its refusal to extend constitutionally protected privacy rights"
and its controversial summary affirmance by the Supreme Court." In Doe, the plaintiff
challenged a Virginia statute making sodomy a crime." The majority declined to hold
that the statute offended the Constitution and stated that the wisdom of the state policy
was an issue for the state to determine." The majority reconciled this decision with
prior Supreme Court privacy cases because the Court had ruled that the Constitution
only condemns state legislation which trespassed upon the right of privacy within mar-
riage." The Doe court relied on Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold, which itself
relied upon Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman for its ruling." Denying that such
authority, based as it was on a dissent, was any less commanding," the majority explicitly
distinguished homosexual activity (which the state proscribed) from marriage (which the
state allowed and protected)." The court found, consequently, "no authoritative judicial
bar to the proscription of homosexuality — since it is obviously no portion of marriage,
home or family life
Thus the Doe majority narrowly interpreted the right of privacy, finding that it
reached only the areas of family, marriage, and procreation. A dissenting opinion by
judge Merhige, however, characterized privacy rights in far more expansive terms.'"
Judge Merhige wrote that the majority misapplied the precedential value of Griswold
through an over-adherence to its factual circumstances." 0 Rather, he believed Griswold
and the related cases protected the right of the individual to be free from unwarranted
128 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Eisenstadt v. Baird.
' 29
 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
"Id. at 1202.
' 31 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g mem., 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va, 1975). See infra notes 172-74
and 190-91 and accompanying text for treatment of the summary affirmance by other courts.
132 The Virginia Code reads in pertinent part:
Crimes against nature. — If any person shall carnally know in any manner any brute
animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the anus or by or with the
mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a
felony and shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than
three years.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-212 (1960).
"Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
's41d. The Doe court stated that "the Constitution condemns State legislation that trespasses
upon the privacy of the incidents of marriage . . ." 1d. (emphasis added).
Lai
	 at 1201.
Ise Id.
Id. (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
' 49 Id. (Merhige, J., dissenting).
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governmental intrusion into those private decisions which were solely matters of indi-
vidual concern."' The dissent further recognized that Eisenstadt v. Baird went beyond
Griswold to remove the marital/nonmarital distinction regarding private sexual acts." 2
The Merhige dissent would protect the right of an adult to Select a sexual partner,
whether heterosexual or homosexual, because that is a personal prerogative which should
not, without compelling justification, be infringed by state regulation.'" Based upon the
record presented to the court, Judge Merhige could divine only one justification for the
statute: the "promotion of morality and decency."L 44 He cited Stanley v. Georgia in support
of his conclusion that the Constitution prohibits state regulation of socially unpopular
activity conducted within the privacy of the horne. 145 He concluded:
[F]undamental rights of such an intimate facet of an individual's life as sex,
absent circumstances warranting intrusion by the State, are to be respected.
My brothers, I respectfully suggest, have by today's ruling misinterpreted
the issue — the issue centers not around morality or decency, but the con-
stitutional right of privacy. 16
Seven years later, in the 1982 case of Baker v. Wade, a Texas Federal District Court
also attempted to discern the scope of constitutional privacy right protection."' The
Baker court felt it was not bound by the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Doe'48
because that decision, without an opinion, did not resolve the issues presented in the
case at bar. 19 And because summary affirmances do not bind a lower court except in
cases precisely on point,L 50 the Baker court felt free to reach the merits of the case. 15 '
In an eloquent and sympathetic opinion, 152 the Baker court recognized a constitu-
tional guarantee protecting fundamental liberties from undue governmental interfer-
ence.'" Admitting that the prior cases nominally addressed marital and family issues,
the majority held that those decisions did not establish the outer limits of the right to
' 4 ' Id. (Merhige, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 1204 (Merhige, J.. dissenting). Because of this, Judge Merhige characterized the
majority's reliance on Justice Harlan's opinion in Poe v. Ullman as "misplaced." Id. at 1203-04
(Merhige, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 1204 (Merhige, J., dissenting). Judge Merhige saw no compelling state interest to
justify the anti-sodomy statute. Id. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting). He characterized as "unworthy
of judicial response" the notion presented by the defendants that "the prohibition of homosexual
conduct will in some manner encourage new heterosexual marriages and prevent the dissolution
of existing ones , ..." Id. (Merhige, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
147 Id. (Merhige, J., dissenting).
146 Id. (Merhige, J., dissenting).
' 47 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Texas 1982) rev'd, 769 17.2cl 289 (5th Cir. 1985).
' 46 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g mem., 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). See supra notes 129-46
and accompanying text for a discussion of Doe.
149 Wade, 553 F. Supp. at 1137.
15° /d.
15 ' Id. at 1138,
152 See id. at 1126-28.
153 Id. at 1134.
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privacy. 154
 Extending the reasoning of the contraception cases,' 55 the Baker court found
that the right to make private, intimate choices without governmental intrusion pertained
not only to a husband and wife, or an unmarried male and female, but also to homo-
sexuals choosing to engage in private sexual activity.'" The majority held, therefore,
that the right of privacy extended to private sexual conduct between consenting adults,
whether heterosexual or homosexual.'"
The Baker court noted that privacy rights logically could not be limited to marital
and procreative choices without ignoring the effects of Stanley and Eisenstadt. 158 Given
that under Stanley the Baker plaintiff could possess homoerotic materials in the privacy
of his home, the court found ludicrous any attempt to draw some constitutional distinc-
tion between the right to sexual gratification through viewing pornographic material
and gratification with a consenting adult partner.' 59 Accordingly, the court held that a
fundamental right of privacy protected homosexual conduct when practiced privately
between consenting adults)" The court noted that although there may be widespread
public distaste for homosexuals, such adverse feeling did not justify denial of privacy
rights.'" The court explained that controversial issues must be resolved free from
emotion, bias, and predilection. 169
The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the district court's decision. 163
 The appellate
court considered the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Doe binding.'" The court
held that because the decision in Doe unquestionably rested on the merits of the case, it
followed that the lower court was bound by Doe as controlling precedent. 10
The 1984 case of Dronenburg v. Zech 166 concerned the United States Navy's policy
requiring dismissal of homosexuals. 167 The petitioner served for nine years as a linguist
' 54 Id. at 1135. The court observed that the "[d]eveloprnent of this area of the law has proceeded
on almost a case-by-case basis, and there are still other fundamental personal liberties — besides
those involved in past Supreme Court decisions — that arc protected by the right of privacy." Id.
See also id. at 1135 n.37.
166 Id. at 1140. The court found that "[t]he right of two individuals to choose what type of
sexual conduct they will enjoy in private is just as personal, just as important, just as sensitive —
indeed, even more so — than the decision by the same couple to engage in sex using a contraceptive
to prevent unwanted pregnancy." Id.
IN Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
' 59 1d. at 1141.
' 60 1d.
15 ' Id. at 1145.
162 Id. The court quoted Justice Holmes' famous Lochner dissent: "[The Constitution] is made
for a people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions
natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment . . ." Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 79 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
' 61 See Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3337 (1986).
164 Id, at 292.
163 Id. The Fifth Circuit noted that lower courts "should follow that controlling authority until
the Supreme Court itself has issued an unequivocal statement that Doe no longer controls." Id.
166 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The military setting arguably complicates the privacy issue.
See Note, Dronenburg v. Zech, The Wrong Case far Asserting a Right of Privacy for Homosexuals, 63
N.C.L. REV. 749, 756-58 (1985).
167 Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1388-89. The Navy regulation provides in pertinent part, "[a]ny
member [of the Navy] who solicits, attempts or engages in homosexual acts shall normally be
separated from the naval service. The presence of such a member in military environment seriously
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and cryptographer with top-security clearance. He claimed that his 1981 discharge
violated his constitutional right of privacy. 1613
Judge Bork, writing for the District of Columbia Circuit,' 69 viewed the privacy right
articulated by the prior Supreme Court cases in extremely narrow terms. Responding
to the Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal, which characterized the cases from Griswold
to Carey as developing a right of privacy of constitutional dimension,' 70 Judge Bork ruled
that whatever the thread of principle discernible from the prior privacy right cases, the
Supreme Court had never defined the right broadly enough to encompass homosexual
conduct.'" Furthermore, although he described Doe v. Comnwnweath's Attorney" as
"somewhat ambiguous precedent,'" he felt it bound lower federal courts. 174
Judge Bork characterized a homosexual's privacy right as distinct from the privacy
rights found in marriage, procreation, and family life.'" He also stated that intermediate
level judges were not authorized to extend legal doctrine enunciated by the Supreme
Court without the higher Court's explicit direction. 0" He viewed Griswold as a case that
stressed the sanctity of marriage and held that the opinion did not indicate what other
activities might be protected by the right of-privacy.'" Furthermore, because the Court
had not provided any guidance for reasoning about future privacy claims, Judge Bork
reasoned that the Griswold privacy protection should not be extended to protect the
appellant's conduct. 178 Similarly, he noted that the Supreme Court had articulated no
principles in Roe v. Wadel" which might guide lower courts in the expanded application
of privacy rights.m
The Dronenburg court, therefore, fashioned its decision not only on the distinctly
non-marital nature of homosexuality but also upon general theories of judicial re-
straint. 181 Noting that even if the Supreme COurt could create new constitutional righis, 182
impairs combat readiness, efficiency, security and morale." SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.90 ( Jan. 20,
I978); Joint Appendix at 216.
168 Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389. Dronenburg filed suit in federal district court challenging the
Navy's policy that mandated discharge of all homosexuals, The district court's opinion was riot
published, When the district court granted summary judgment for the Navy, Dronenburg appealed
the adverse judgment to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 1983.
I" Antonin Scalia, now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, was a member of the D.C.
Circuit when it decided Dronenburg.
170 Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391.
17 ' Id.
' 72 403 F. Supp 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). See supra notes 129-46 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Doe.
E7' Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392.
178 Id.
'" Id.
170 Id. at 1396 n.5. See also Comment, Dronenburg v, Zech: Strict Construction or Abdication of
Judicial Responsibility?, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 669, 673 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Dronenburg
v. Zech].
'" Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392.
'"Id.
'" Id. at 1394-95 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973)).
'" Id. at 1395. The Dronenburg court stated that "the Court provided no explanatory principle
that informs a lower court how to reason about what is and is not encompassed by the right of
privacy." Id.
181 Id. at 1396.
1" Judge Bork candidly pointed out he did not share the belief that the Supreme Court could
create new constitutional rights. Id, at 1396 n.5.
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Judge Bork wrote that lower courts clearly should refrain from doing so.'" Therefore,
he concluded, the Constitution provides no constitutional right to engage in homosexual
conduct and judges have no power to create such a right. 184
13. Hardwick v. Bowers and Bowers v. Hardwick
Hardwick v. Bowers, decided by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 1985,
challenged the constitutionality of the state's anti-sodomy statute.'" This ruling became
the basis for the most recent Supreme Court decision addressing the law governing
private homosexual activity.'" On August 3, 1982, a policeman arrested Michael Hard-
wick, aged 29, in his bedroom for practicing oral sex with another man."' The arresting
officer — admitted to the apartment by another occupant — was there to serve a warrant
for Hardwick's failure to pay an earlier fine.'" The officer arrested both men and
charged them with sodomy. Sodomy is a felony under Georgia law, punishable by up to
20 years in prison.'"
I " Id. at 1396. The court observed that "[w]e have no guidance from the Constitution or, as
we have shown with respect to the cases at hand, from articulated Supreme Court principle." Id.
"" Id. at 1397. This statement goes beyond the context of the case, which only concerned the
Navy's blanket policy of discharging homosexuals, and reached homosexual conduct in general. Id.
Furthermore, Judge Bork labeled as "completely frivolous" Dronenburg's argument that the military
policy of across-the-board exclusion of homosexuals was grounded in the majoritarian prejudice
that homosexuality is not socially acceptable and that under such a policy no minority rights would
be safe from discrimination. Id. Because the policy was not unconstitutional per se, the court stated
that it need only address the question of whether the Navy's policy was rationally related to a
permissible end. Id. at 1397-98. In response to that question, the court held,
To ask the question is to answer it. The effects of homosexual conduct within a naval
or military unit are almost certain to be harmful to morale and discipline. The Navy
is not required to produce social science data or the results of controlled experiments
to prove what common sense and common experience demonstrate. This very case
illustrates dangers of the sort the Navy is entitled to consider ....
Id. Therefore, using a minimum rationality review, the court upheld the Navy regulation as ration-
ally related to the legitimate end manifested in the judiciary's deference to military decisions. Id.
See also Casenote, Dronenburg v. Zech: Judicial Restraint or Judicial Prejudice?, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 245, 248-49 (1984) (criticizing Judge Bork's "shallow analysis" and unconvincing demonstra-
tion of support for the regulation). Another commentator felt that the decision revealed the court's
"faith in majoritarian morality and its distrust of the privacy doctrine ...." Comment, Dronenburg
v. Zech, supra note 176, at 671. The D.C. Circuit denied Dronenburg's petition for rehearing en
bane, notwithstanding an emotional dissent. 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (Robinson,
C.J., Wald, Mikva, and Edwards, JJ., dissenting). Writing for the dissenters, Chief Judge Robinson
stated he was "deeply troubled" by Judge Bork's "revisionist view of constitutional jurisprudence,"
and characterized the "extravagant exegesis on the constitutional right of privacy [as] wholly
unnecessary to decide the case before the court." Id. at 1580 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting). He found
"particularly inappropriate" Judge Bork's decision to "wipe away selected Supreme Court decisions
in the name of judicial restraint," and characterized the decision as a "general spring cleaning of
constitutional law." Id. (Robinson, C.J., dissenting). "Judicial restraint," he concluded, "begins at
home .... [T]he constitutional right of privacy, whatever its genesis, is by now firmly established.
An intermediate judge may regret its presence, but he or she must apply it diligently." Id. (Robinson,
C.J., dissenting).
760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).
116
 Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
187 N.Y. Times, July 1, 1986, at M9, col. 3. Neither the Supreme Court nor Eleventh Circuit
opinions set forth the facts.
185 Id.
169 Id. See supra note 3 for the text of the statute.
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1. Hardwick v. Bowers
Despite some feeling that Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney disposed of Hardwick's
claim,m the court held that doctrinal developments after Doe undermined whatever
controlling weight it once might have possessed."' With the way clear to reach the merits
IN Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1207-08. As noted earlier, supra notes 147-51, the Supreme Court's
summary affirmance of Doe created confusion in the lower courts and provided "ambiguous prec-
edent." Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388,1392 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Lower courts were mystified as
to the exact issues resolved by the decision, as well as to its binding authority. Baker v. Wade, 553
F. Supp. 1121,1137 (N.D. Texas 1982). But see Dronenburg, 741 E2d at 1392 ( Judge Bork finding
the summary affirmance to be binding). The plaintiffs in Doe were homosexuals who had neither
been arrested nor threatened with prosecution. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1207 n.5. Because the plaintiffs
had no more than a generalized grievance regarding the statute, they may have lacked proper
standing to challenge the law. Id. Legal claims must arise from a genuine case or controversy and
require a plaintiff with a personal stake in the outcome sufficient to assure the proper adversarial
presentation of the case. Id. at 1204. That Doe was a proper plaintiff, the Hardwick court stated,
could not readily be discerned from the Supreme Court's decision. Id. at 1207. The Eleventh Circuit
noted in Hardwick,
The fact that the Supreme Court in Doe affirmed a dismissal on the merits below
rather than vacating the judgment with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction does not demonstrate that the Court reached the merits of the
case, While an appellate court that finds lack of standing normally will vacate the
judgment and remand for dismissal, the Supreme Court has not uniformly followed
that course.
Id. at 1207 n.5. Therefore, the Hardwick majority, while acknowledging that the summary affirmance
was binding, felt that the Doe holding must be carefully limited because the Court disposed of the
case without explaining its reasons. Id. at 1207. The Hardwick court explained that although the
Doe holding denied the plaintiff's claim for an injunction invalidating the sodomy statute, and
addressed the constitutional issues presented, the Supreme Court in its summary affirmance could
have approved the result without addressing the constitutional issues because the plaintiffs in Doe
"plainly lacked standing to sue." Id. Because the lack of standing is an issue more narrow than the
constitutional issue, the Hardwick court stated, a lower court rationally could assume that the
Supreme Court decided the case on the narrower ground. Id. at 1208. The Hardwick majority,
therefore, construed Doe as an affirmance based on the plaintiffs' lack of standing, but not con-
trolling on the case at bar. Id.
Irrespective of this, the Hardwick court also concluded that because Hardwick alleged that the
sodomy statute violated his first amendment rights (a claim not addressed in the district court
opinion of Doe), the summary affirmance could not control in all of Hardwick's legal claims. Id. at
n.6. Judge Kravitch, however, stated that the Eleventh Circuit had no authority to reach the merits
of Hardwick's constitutional claim. Id. at 1213 (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). She found the majority's argument for declining to follow Doe unpersuasive, would have
recognized the summary affirmance as having binding precedential effect on the merits, and would
have affirmed the district court's dismissal of Hardwick's complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Id. (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
' 91 The Hardwick court cited a number of actions by the Supreme Court which indicated the
constitutional issue purportedly foreclosed by Doe might still he unsettled. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at
1209. The first indication was found in Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See supra
notes 97-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of Carey. In Carey, the Court, inter alia,
invalidated a New York statute that prohibited the sale of non-prescription contraceptives. A
concurring opinion by Justice Powell took exception to the majority's unnecessarily broad action of
subjecting all state regulations affecting adult sexual relations to the strictest standard of judicial
review. Carey, 431 U.S. at 703 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
responded that the holding did have limits: it applied only to state regulations that burdened an
individual's right to prevent conception by substantially limiting access to contraceptives. Id. at 688
n.5. Justice Brennan then observed that "the Court has not definitively answered the difficult
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of the case, the court analyzed the constitutional claim presented. 192 The Eleventh Circuit
first characterized the issue as one of personal autonomy and explained that the Con-
stitution prevents the states from unduly interfering in certain individual decisions critical
to personal autonomy.' 93 Because those decisions are essentially private, the court de-
scribed them as beyond the legitimate reach of a civilized society.' 91 Although prior
privacy cases involved procreative or family issues and Hardwick's claim implicated
neither, the court held the petitioner's desire to engage privately in sexual activity with
another consenting adult involved important associational interests.'" The majority rec-
ognized the importance of sexual intimacy for all persons and, therefore, did not limit
the right to the strict contours of a traditional marriage)" The court reasoned that the
intimate association protected against state interference is not found in the marriage
relationship alone. 197 Because this conduct might serve for Hardwick the same purpose
as the intimacy in marriage, the court concluded that the protection afforded by privacy
rights should reach his claim.' 98
Citing Stanley v. Georgia, the court asserted that the fact that Hardwick had carried
out his sexual activity at home bolstered its significance as an activity protected by privacy
question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private
consensual sexual] behavior among adults." Id. (quoting id.. 431 U.S. at 694 n.17).
Because the Court cited a law review comment in footnote 17 of its opinion regarding appli-
cation of Supreme Court precedent to overturning state statutes outlawing private consensual sexual
activity such as sodomy, the Hardwick court concluded that the issue remained unsettled. Hardwick,
760 F.2d at 1209. The court decided to hear the merits of Michael Hardwick's claim despite Justice
Rehnquist's statement in his Carey dissent that he considered the question closed. Id. See also
Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1214-15 (Kravitch, j„ concurring in part and dissenting in part).
New York v. Uplinger, 464 U.S. 812 (1983), is the second post-Doe development which the
Hardwick court felt undermined the binding authority of Doe's summary affirmance. In Uplinger,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari but later dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. 467
U.S. 246 (1984). Uplinger came to the Court from the New York Court of Appeals. 58 N.Y.2d 936,
447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1983). That court had invalidated a state statute prohibiting
persons from loitering in a public place for the purpose of engaging in deviate sexual behavior. Id.
at 938, 447 N.E.2d at 63, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 515. In so ruling, the court relied on the earlier New
York case of People v, Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981), which held that the United States Constitution invalidated a state statute
criminalizing any act of sodomy between two persons. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1210. In Uplinger, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of' state laws criminalizing con-
sensual adult sodomy, Id. The Court received briefs and heard oral arguments before deciding that
the case was an inappropriate vehicle for resolving the important constitutional issues raised, the
Hardwick court noted. Id, Based on these factors, the Hardwick court concluded that the constitutional
questions presented by Hardwick remained open for consideration and that the district court had
erred in dismissing his claim. Id. at 1210.
199
 Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1210.
193 Id. at 1211.
194
 /d.
195
 Id,
196 Id. at 1211-12. The Eleventh Circuit observed that "[t]he marital relationship is also signif-
icant because of the unsurpassed opportunity for mutual support and self expression that it
provides." Id. The court viewed the marital relationship protected in Griswold and the associational
interests protected in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385-86 (1978) (statute which placed certain
restrictions on the right of remarriage held to infringe the fundamental right to marry) as being
conceptually distinct. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
197 11ardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
198 Id.
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rights. 122 The court concluded, therefore, that the activity Hardwick hoped to engage in
was quintessentially private. His relationship was an intimate association beyond the
scope of state regulation. 200
2. Bowers v. Hardwick
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision. 2"
Writing for the majority, Justice White characterized the right of privacy announced in
prior cases as inhering only in marriage, family, and procreation."' Justice White held
that none of the rights announced in the marital/procreative cases could be analogized
to reach homosexual activity.'" While conceding that many cases had recognized rights
having little or no textual support in the language of the Constitution, Justice White
wrote that the Court should only cautiously announce rights not readily identifiable in
the Constitution. This caution assures the public that the justices are not creating rights
out of their own values.'" He noted that historically, to limit the category of rights which
would qualify for heightened judicial protection, the Court had established a policy of
reviewing only those liberties characterized as "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
traditions." 205 Because the proscription against sodomy had ancient roots,'" justice White
found no mandate to extend to homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in acts of
consensual sex.' 07 In fact, he characterized a claim to that right as "at best, facetious." 208
Justice White also reasoned that judicial restraint militated against extending privacy
protection to reach homosexual activity. 202 He stated that he was disinclined to discover
"new" fundamental rights, 210 which he viewed as a legislative rather than judicial re-
sponsibility.""
The majority dismissed Hardwick's argument that Stanley v. Georgia protected his
conduct. Justice White distinguished Stanley as a decision firmly grounded in the first
' 99 Id.
200 Id.
201 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1986).
202 Id.
2"' Id. at 2844. The Court stated, "we think it evident that none of the rights announced in
those cases bears arty resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in
acts of sodomy ." Id.
209 Id.
205 Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) and Moore v. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
206 Id. Justice White stated that sodomy was a criminal offense forbidden by the laws of the
original thirteen stales when they ratified the Bill of Rights. Id. at 2844 & n.5. When the states
ratified the fourteenth amendment in 1868, all but five of the thirty-seven states had criminal
sodomy laws. Id. at 2844, 2845 n.6. Until 1961, all fifty states outlawed sodomy. Id. at 2845.
Currently, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia provide criminal penalties for sodomy
performed in private between consenting adults. Id.
2" Id at 2844.
2°8 Id. at 2846.
200 Id. See supra note 20 and accompanying text for the supporting language from Justice
White's opinion.
210 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
211 Id. The Court observed that "[oltherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further
authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority." Id.
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amendment. 212 Hardwick's right of privacy, he continued, had no similar support in the
text of the Constitution. 2 "
Finally, the Court dismissed Hardwick's claim that the Georgia statute needed a
more rational basis than the presumed belief by the popular majority that homosexual
sodomy was immoral and unacceptable. 2 " Justice White claimed that law constantly was
based on notions of morality. 2" He therefore disagreed that the general population's
sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared an inadequate jus-
tification for the statute. 2"
In a short concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger underscored the historic disap-
probation society has placed on homosexual conduct. 217
 He cited Judeo-Christian ethical
standards, Roman law, and the ecclesiastical courts of England . 2 " He further cited
Blackstone's description of "the infamous crime against nature ... the very mention of
which is a disgrace to human nature ... and a crime not fit to be named." 219 Chief Justice
Burger concluded that only by casting aside millennia of moral teaching could the Court
protect the rights of homosexuals to practice consensual sodomy. 22°
Justice Blackmun authored a dissenting opinion and took the unusual and dramatic
step of reading it from the bench. 22 I He argued that the majority failed to recognize the
legal principles which lay beneath the factual surface of Hardwick's claim:
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, than Stanley v. Georgia was about
a fundamental right to watch obscene movies . . . Rather, this case is about
"the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men," namely, "the right to be let alone." 222
Justice Blackmun believed the Court should have analyzed the respondent's claim in
light of the values which underlie the constitutional right of privacy. 223 He viewed the
212 Id.
20 Id. To rule otherwise, Justice White stated, would further confuse the limits to which
victimless crimes (such as drug use) would be immunized from prosecution merely because com-
mitted at home. Id. Even if Hardwick had limited his claim to the right of privacy for voluntary
sexual conduct between consenting adults, the Court noted that distinguishing between the claimed
right of homosexual conduct and other privately practiced adult conduct clearly susceptible to
prosecution — such as adultery and incest — would be difficult. Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. But see supra note 162 and accompanying text for Justice Holmes' words on the same
subject.
217
	 at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
218 Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
219 Id. (Burger, CJ., concurring) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215).
220 Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring),
221 N.Y. 'nines, July 1, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
222 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)). Compare with text supra at note
146 for similar language by Judge Merhige in his Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney dissent.
223 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also took exception
to the majority's failure to give the Georgia statute a close reading. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In particular, he found that "[u]nlike the Court, the Georgia legislature has nut proceeded on the
assumption that homosexuals are so different from other citizens .. Id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). He elaborated that the statutory language criminalizes sodomy for heterosexuals as well
as homosexuals, yet the petitioner defended the law on the grounds that it prohibits homosexual
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Georgia law as interfering with Hardwick's constitutionally protected interests in privacy
and Freedom of intimate association, 224 and he chastised the Court For ignoring this
infringement. 225
The Blackmun dissent recognized the larger issue which Hardwick's claim ad-
dressed: the constitutional promise that a private sphere of individual liberty would be
kept beyond the reach of governmental interference. 225 justice Blackmun felt this prom-
ise was valid both in regard to certain decisions which the individual was entitled to
make, as well as to certain places where he or she was entitled to make them. 227 He
accused the majority of misapplying the precedential value of the prior privacy cases by
rigidly adhering to the marital/procreative model from which the cases arose. 228 While
the prior cases may have arisen from circumstances related to the family, Justice Black-
mun explained that limiting privacy rights to that factual situation would do violence to
the basic reasons certain rights associated with the family initially were accorded protec-
tion: because these rights contributed so directly to individual welfare. 228 Justice Black-
activity. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun felt that Hardwick's claim might rest in
significant part upon "Georgia's apparent willingness to enforce against homosexuals a law it seems
not to have any desire to enforce against heterosexuals." Id. (Blackmun, 3., dissenting). See infra
notes 243-51 and accompanying text for Justice Stevens' equal protection analysis.
224 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
225 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting), Justice Blackmun wrote, "[t]he Court's cramped reading of
the issue before it makes for a short opinion, but does little to make for a persuasive one." Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
225
	
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. & Gyn, 106
S. Ct. 2169, 2184 (1986)).
227 Id. at 2850-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun viewed decisions regarding
education of one's child or termination of a pregnancy as examples of private decisions, See, e.g.,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion decision protected by the Constitution); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (course of a child's education is determined by parents rather than
the State). Illustrative of protected private enclaves are United States v. Kiro, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)
(electronic surveillance of private residence violates fourth amendment right of those who have a
justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (under
the fourth amendment, private residence may not be entered to effect an arrest without a warrant);
Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960) (fourth amendment guarantee of no unreasonable search
and seizure also protects places other than private residence). Justice Blackmun felt that Hardwick's
claim implicated both the decisional and spacial aspects of the right to privacy. Bowers, 106 S. Ct.
at 2850-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22"
	
at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229 Id, (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 421 U.S. 494, 501 (1977)).
Justice Blackmun contended,
Me protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material way,
to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual's
Mhe concept of privacy embodies the "moral fact that a person belongs to himself
and not others nor to society as a whole."
Id. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obst. & Gyn.,
106 S. Ct. 2169, 2187, n.5 (1986)). Similarly, Justice Blackmun noted, the Court protects the right
to marry because marriage promotes "a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects." Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). He stated that the Court
protects procreative choices because children "so dramatically alter an individual's self-definition,
not because of demographic considerations or the Bible's command to he fruitful and multiply."
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Blackmun stated, the Court protects the family
"because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of individuals, not because of a preference
for stereotypical households." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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mun recognized that the underlying interest protected by privacy rights was related to
human need and the emotional enrichment found in close ties with others Y 90
 And
because intimate sexual relationships are so significant to self definition, justice Blackmun
urged that individuals be allowed to choose freely the nature of those relationships."'
While the majority contended it only refused to recognize a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy, Justice Blackmun believed that the majority actually
ignored the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their
intimate associations." 2 Similarly, by ignoring the special significance which the fourth
amendment attaches to the home, Justice Blackmun felt that the majority failed to
consider the broader principles of personal security which had informed the Court's
prior privacy decisions. 2" He characterized the Court's treatment of Stanley v. Georgia as
"entirely unconvincing" 2" and noted that although the majority dismissed Stanley as a
first amendment case, 2" the Stanley Court itself had anchored its holding in the fourth
amendment's protection of the home. 2" He concluded, therefore, that fourth amend-
ment guarantees provided a textual basis for Hardwick's claim and discredited the
majority's ruling that the privacy right had no support in the text of the Constitution. 27
Justice Blackmun attacked the Court's reliance on social and biblical prohib-
itions against homosexuality as a justification for upholding the Georgia law. He claimed
that neither the length of time a majority has held a conviction nor the passion with
"" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 600, 619
(1984)).
2" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He reasoned, "in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may
be many 'right' ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a relation-
ship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely
personal bonds." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
2" Id, at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
7" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
199
	 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 2846.
2" Id. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846). The Blackmun
dissent further criticized the majority's treatment of Stanley, id. at 2846, which maintained that
extension of the privacy right might lead to a protection of all victimless crimes so long as practiced
in the home. Id. at 2853-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He saw no reason to equate consensual
homosexual sex with possession in the home of drugs, fire arms, or stolen goods — all offenses to
which Stanley, in Justice Blackmun's view, refused to extend protection. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11. Justice Blackmun distinguished voluntary sexual activity from
drugs and weapons possession. Fie termed voluntary sexual activity properly "victimless," while
drugs and weapons are not victimless because they are inherently dangerous. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at
2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Nor could Justice Blackmun agree with the majority's conclusion that approving one type of
voluntary sexual conduct between adults would interfere with the Court's ability to proscribe
adultery and incest. Id. at 2853 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See id. at 2846. Justice Blackmun
reasoned that both adultery and incest are analytically distinct from the voluntary conduct involved
in Bowers because adultery is likely to injure third parties and the absence of true consent allows
for a blanket prohibition of incest. Id. at 2853 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Furthermore, he
criticized the majority for making the conceptual error of grouping private consensual homosexual
activity with adultery and incest; more appropriately, he contended, the Court should group
homosexual activity with private consensual heterosexual activity between unmarried persons or
married persons, including anal and oral sex within marriage. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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which it defends that conviction justifies removing legislation from the Courts scrutiny. 238
He analogized the Hardwick claim to Loving v. Virginia,"" where the state relied on
religious justification for its miscegenation statute. Upon review, however, the Supreme
Court invalidated the law and recognized freedom of choice to marry as a vital personal
right. 24" Justice Blackmun argued that the majority's reliance on traditional Judeo-
Christian values undermined rather than buttressed its position. The legitimacy of
legislation does not depend upon conformity with religious doctrine, he stated. 241 Rather,
Justice Blackmun noted, legislation should respect the intellectually and spiritually di-
verse social organization of our nation: "[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that
do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance
is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order." 242
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens made an equal protection argument. He
pointed out that the Georgia statute, and the rationale of the Court's opinion, would
have to apply equally to married or unmarried persons, and to persons of the same or
different genders.243 Because the statute on its face prohibits both homosexual and
heterosexual sodomy, the proper analysis of its constitutionality, according to Justice
Stevens, required a consideration of two questions. 244 First, could the statute totally
prohibit the conduct? And second, if not, was there justification for its selective enforce-
ment against homosexuals? 245
For Justice Stevens, the privacy cases of Griswold through Carey answered the first
question in the negative. Those decisions insured that individuals were at liberty to
engage in sexual conduct that others condemned as immora1. 24" The second question —
"' Id. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun showed his hand early with respect
to this issue. He began his dissent by citing Justice Holmes:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation
of the past.
Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. Rev. 457,
469 (1897)).
21'1 See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's treatment of
Loving.
24U Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2854 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, also analogized to Loving. He noted, interestingly, that society once
treated miscegenation as a crime similar to sodomy. Id. at 2857 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24 ' Id. at 2854-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting):
241 Id. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ, v. Barnett, 319
U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943)).
"1 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2856 (Stevens, J., dissenting), In fact, five months after its decision in
Bowers, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in an Oklahoma criminal case which declared uncon-
stitutional a statute barring private acts of oral and anal sex between heterosexual adults. See
Oklahoma v. Post, 715 P.2d 1 105 (Okla. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 290 (1986), The Supreme
Court is unwilling, apparently, to enforce against heterosexuals the same type of statute it enforces
against homosexuals.
244 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2857 (Stevens,	 dissenting).
245 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2" Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated, "Nile essential 'liberty' that animated the
development of the law in cases like Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey surely embraces the right to
engage in nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others may consider offensive or immoral." Id. at
2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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regarding selective application — Justice Stevens approached by examining whether
those persons to whom the state wished to apply the statute had a different liberty
interest than the general population. This he saw as plainly unacceptable. 247 Homosexuals
and heterosexuals have the same interest in deciding how they will conduct their vol-
untary intimate associations. According to Justice Stevens, intrusive state regulation of
that private conduct is equally burdensome on both groups. 248
Justice Stevens also noted that the majority's presumption that the Georgia electorate
disfavored homosexual sodomy was illogical. 249 The statute, on its face, makes no dis-
tinction between homosexuals and heterosexuals. The majority, according to Justice
Stevens, should have presumed instead that the electorate found all sodomy immoral
and unacceptable: 25° The language of the statute, however, did not support the majority's
holding, in his view."'
III. RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS NOT PREVIOUSLY RECOGNIZED
Although, the factual contexts of the cases construing privacy rights in the past
quarter century have varied, the decisions defining the right reduce to variation on a
single theme: the freedom of the individual to form intimate associations without state
interference. 252 Because the right has not been articulated explicitly in these terms, the
Supreme Court has not clearly defined the freedom, nor clearly delineated the reach of
its application. 255 It has been explained insufficiently to allow for reasonable predictions
of which activities will be constitutionally protected. 2" Justice Brandeis characterized the
right of privacy as a comprehensive right — the right to be let alone:
24'Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). One commentator argues that an assertion of gay rights is
stronger if predicated solely upon an equal protection argument. See Note, The Constitutional Status
of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. Rev. 1285 (1985). The
author claims that the privacy argument suffers from the fundamentally flawed misconception that
homosexuality exists solely in the bedroom. Id. at 1289. Because sexuality is a continuous expression
of personhood, having expression in private as well as public domains, id. at 1290, a more compre-
hensive assertion of rights is needed. Id. at 1287. An equal protection argument confronts prejudice
affecting the private realm (such as statutes affecting a gay person's choice of sexual partner) and
the public sphere (such as a policy affecting employment discrimination). Id. at 1297.
Similarly, another commentator has argued for a more expansive reading of the Equal Protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. See generally BAF.R. EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
(1983). Such a liberalized view is warranted, Baer suggests, based upon the amendment's philo-
sophical roots. Id. at 24. She advocates a new constitutional theory that will recognize new and
important claims while remaining faithful to the history of equal protection. Id. at 31. A less stingy
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's promise of equality, she argues, and a modification
of how the Court structures its suspect classification analysis, see generally id. at 105-30, would fulfill
the promises of Reconstruction and meet the legitimate expectations of homosexual persons as-
serting a liberty claim under the Constitution. See generally id. at 225-52.
249 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See id, at 2846.
25° Id. at 2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
25'Id, (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252
 Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 625 (1980).
255 Id. One commentator has described the privacy right as kaleidoscopic: "Just as a kaleidoscope
presents an image for which there is no corresponding object, ... [privacy] is a composite term
whose sense is illusory." Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 42 (1967).
254 Compare Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Texas 1982) (homosexual privacy protected)
with Dronenburg v. Zech, 754 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (homosexual privacy not protected).
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The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. 255
The right to be let alone, according to justice Brandeis, protects the individual from
unwarranted interference by the government. Some courts properly guard this compre-
hensive right by emphasizing the individual's right to act autonomously. Other courts,
however, display a willingness to accord individual liberty only to those personal decisions
made in the context of marriage. By characterizing the right to be let alone as a
comprehensive right, however, Justice Brandeis spoke of the values which transcend the
factual circumstances of a particular case. Consequently, an understanding of privacy
will be improved if one looks beyond the decisions and identifies the real interest to be
protected. 256
Although the initial cases which identified a right of privacy were rooted in the
context of marriage, family, or procreation, 252 the privacy cases place an equal emphasis
on the right to personal autonomy. Decisions about family planning, a child's education,
or the determination of whom one may marry are private matters; meddling in those
decisions invades a person's privacy because it compromises that individual's autonomy. 255
Autonomy affords an individual the capacity to make independent moral judgments and
the willingness and courage to exercise those judgments even when they are unpopular
ones.259 Autonomous individuals, of course, may be married or single, male or female,
heterosexual or homosexual.
In cases involving voluntary homosexual activity, some courts continue to interpret
privacy rights as limited to protecting only marital or family values. 260 Other courts
recognize the broader aspects of privacy and view the right as protecting an individual's
right to form intimate associations, either traditional or non-traditional. 26 L How a court
characterizes the right of privacy — either marital or individual — seems to direct the
final disposition of the case. 2 C 2 In this way courts fashion either a narrow or expansive
definition of privacy. The Bowers v. Hardwick majority employed the more restrictive
255 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
258 See generally Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980).
257 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 479 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
258 Gross, supra note 253, at 38.
259 Gavison, supra note 256, at 449.
26° See,' e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
m Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1984); Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121
(N.D. Texas 1982); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
292 Bowers illustrates this dichotomy. The majority chose to view privacy rights as relating to
marriage, family, and procreation, Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844, while the dissenting justices recognized
a broader individual-rights based meaning of privacy; "what the Court really has refused to rec-
ognize is the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate
associations with others." Id. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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interpretation. The Supreme Court's commitment to an autonomy-based definition of
privacy, however, would better guard the more egalitarian notion of protecting all
individuals in their right to form fulfilling affectional ties. Such a commitment would
permit the extension of that protected interest to all non-harmful consensual adult sexual
activity, whether heterosexual or homosexual.
The two prevailing formulations of the privacy right which compete for the courts'
acceptance are a right grounded in the conventional interests of marriage and family,
and a privacy right grounded in notions of individual autonomy. 263 The autonomy-based
notion is the more expansive of the two because, whereas married people clearly can
retain individual rights, unmarried individuals cannot claim family-based rights. The
autonomy-based right protects individuals and their right to make choices; it reinforces
"that persons as such have a set of capacities that enable them, with a sense of separateness
from other persons, to make independent decisions regarding appropriate life
choices." 2"
The right of privacy rooted in marriage, while it incidentally protects the values of
individuals who participate in the convention and whose values are harmonious with
conventional morality, disregards individual choices altogether. Such a right only protects
interests affiliated in some way with marital values — such as the choice of partner
protected in Loving or the decision to use contraceptives protected in Griswold. Limiting
which activities will be protected, by requiring that they be related to the family or
marriage, severely impairs the underlying interest seeking protection: the right of all
individuals to act intimately without undue governmental intrusion. The constitutional
guarantee is seriously diminished in scope if it protects conventional modes of behavior
but excludes unique or atypical variations. 265
Laurence Tribe notes that because the right of personhood customarily has been
limited to liberties recognized as fundamental in our society, it is crucial to define a right
expansively when asserting a liberty claim. 2" Predicating privacy rights on the status of
marriage is, therefore, unfairly conditional. The need for intimacy and the inappro-
priateness of state intrusion does not, after all, extinguish outside the marital state.
Defining the right at a high enough level of generality, however, permits "unconventional
variants to claim protection along with mainstream versions of the protected conduct." 267
Once the right of privacy is defined in terms general enough to tap into the underlying
interest protected, it provides an umbrella capacious enough to subsume homosexual as
well as heterosexual variants. 268 For the courts to tell active homosexuals that a right of
privacy protects them in traditional marital and family decisions is analogous to the
famous irony: "The law in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." 269
26'
	 Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of
Familial Privacy, 14 tinly. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 362 (1979).
26' Richards, Taking 'Taking Rights Seriously' Seriously: Reflections on Dworkin and the American
Revival of Natural Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1329 (1977) (emphasis in original).
265 supra note 263, at 365. Professor Eichbaum notes Itjhe human dignity protected
by constitutional guarantees would be seriously diminished if people were not free to choose and
adopt a lifestyle which allows expression of their uniqueness and individuality." Id.
266 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15.13, at 944 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
267 Id. at § 15-13, at 946.
268 Id,
Eichbaum, supra note 263, at 367 (quoting A. FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE, 117-18 (1894)).
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The homosexual activity cases provide a correlation. Those judges who viewed
homosexual activity as protected by the constitutional right of privacy employed an
analysis evidencing acceptance of an autonomy-based definition. 2" Conversely, those
judges who viewed privacy as family-based, and therefore limited, declined to protect
homosexual activity, 271
In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, the majority upheld the state anti-sodomy law and
found there was no authoritative judicial bar to the proscription of homosexuality
because it was "obviously no portion of marriage, home or family life ... . "272 Similarly,
in Dronenburg v. Zech, 273 Judge Bork, after examining the Supreme Court's privacy cases
announced that the cases which served as the foundation for privacy rights were related
to family and marital relationships. It hardly needed to be said, he wrote, that homo-
sexual relationships were distinguishable. 274
In contrast., Judge Merhige, dissenting in Doe, recognized that the right of privacy
did not diminish when applied to parties not involved in a marital relationship. He felt
that the freedom to choose an adult sexual partner was open to all individuals, irre-
spective of their sexual or affectional preference.275 In Baker v. Wade, the majority
characterized the right of privacy as protecting personal liberties from governmental
interference,27i and claimed that every individual had the right to decide important
intimate matters without state interference. 277 Ott this basis, the privacy right encompas-
sed the right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate sexual activity. 27g And the
Eleventh Circuit in Hardwick v. Bowers 279 held that the Constitution prevented the states
from "unduly interfering in certain individual decisions critical to personal autonomy
The majority recognized that Hardwick's homosexual conduct, although not
procreative, involved an important associational interest. 281 By looking beyond the factual
surface to the next level of generality, the court recognized that the underlying interest
270 See Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2852 (Blackmun, .1., dissenting); Baker v, Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121,
1141 (N.D. Texas 1982); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va.
1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting).
271 See Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2844; Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1395-96 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1201-02.
27 Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1202. Interestingly, the Doe court also noted that t.0 uphold the
legislation, the state only need establish that the conduct likely would contribute to moral delin-
quency. Id. As an example of moral delinquency, the court cited Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F, Supp. 620
(E. D. Va. 1973), which involved a married couple who engaged in group sex in front of the couple's
children. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1202. Why such a case implicates homosexuals who, at least statistically,
have fewer children than the general population is not entirely clear.
275 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
274 Id. at 1395-96. The Droncnlmrg court observed that "Mlle Court has listed as illustrative of
the right of privacy such matters as activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, Family
relationships, and child rearing and education. It need hardly be said that none of these cover a
right to homosexual activity." Id.
275 Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting). Judge Merhige noted in dissent, "Itio
say that the right of privacy ... is limited to marital, home or family life is unwarranted under the
law." Id. (Merhige, J., dissenting).
553 F. Supp. at 1134 (emphasis added).
'177 Id. at 1140 (emphasis added).
278 Id.
279 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).
2" Id. at 1211 (emphasis added).
281 Id.
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protected in the marital relationship was an important element of Hardwick's relationship
as well: "the unsurpassed opportunity for mutual support and self-expression. "282
Courts are not without direction when asked to adjudicate what appear to be novel
claims. Rather than acting arbitrarily, courts can analogize from existing allied law and
persuasively demonstrate that an untried right may be subsumed under a right already
recognized. 288 Professors Warren and Brandeis noted that courts must constantly rede-
fine the exact nature of legal rights so as to reflect accurately social change. 284 As
civilization evolves and new claims are recognized as deserving legal protection, the
courts must refine the law to accommodate these legitimately asserted elaims. 285
The law must be dynamic for a number of reasons. Technological advances create
unthought of intrusions from which individuals need protection. 280 Similarly, the per-
ceived need for a law can evaporate as social evolution exposes the impropriety of an
outmoded piece of legislation. The anti-miscegenation statute invalidated in Loving, for
example, seemed reasonable in the nineteenth century. As society became more enlight-
ened, however, state-mandated segregation was recognized as untenable."'
These changes in the law do not require unprecedented judicial leaps of faith.
Courts can, by a reasoned elaboration of principle, competently contour the law. 288 The
judiciary is best suited for bringing law and society into harmony. 289 Anchored by
principles indicative of shared purposes in society, such as the right to be free from
undue governmental intrusion, judges legitimately fashion reasonable variations of es-
tablished legal doctrine to reflect and accommodate rights not previously recognized,
rights newly defined in light of social evolution. 2"
The courts that extended the privacy right initially found in marriage to an individ-
ual right not anchored to the marital convention did so upon a reasoned elaboration of
principle. These courts viewed the underlying principle at a higher level of generality.
From that vantage point it became clear that individual rights could not he limited to
the status of marriage. 291
Griswold established the principle that the state cannot interfere with a marital
decision as personal as family planning. But Eisenstadt clarified that the right of privacy
in sexual matters is not limited to married couples."2 Because Griswold presumably would
282 14. at 1211-12.
2" See supra note 45 for a discussion of how the courts can approach novel litigation.
284 Sec supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text for reference to Warren and Brandeis's
discussion of the evolution of common law.
28s
288
	 supra note 30 for a discussion of Abigail Roberson's claim necessitated by the invention
of photography.
287
	 Supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's reasoning in
Loving. See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text for Justice Blackmun's analysis of Loving's
effect on Bowers.
288
	
supra note 45 for Levi's view on the development of the common law.
289 Id.
290
 See Fuller, supra note 14.
2 ' 1 Karst, supra note 252, at 652. Professor Karst argues "Mlle logic of the freedom of intimate
association — that is, the implication of the values that are the substantive components of this
associational freedom — cannot be contained at the status boundaries of formal marriage ... ." Id.
292 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972). As Justice Brennan wrote, "[ill' the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion . ." Id. (emphasis in original). This language is quoted in Hardwick
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invalidate a state statute that prohibits consensual sodomy by a married couple, and
Eisenstadt would invalidate a statute that applied to unmarried persons as wel1, 293 it is
difficult to understand how the Bowers Court could sustain a statute that proscribes
consensual sodomy between unmarried individuals, whether heterosexual or homosex-
ual. 294
Stanley v, Georgia reiterated the individual right of privacy against governmental
intrusion. The Stanley decision put the regulation of socially disfavored activity beyond
the reach of the state so long as the activity takes place within the confines of the home. 295
The Eleventh Circuit, in Hardwick, recognized that Stanley bolstered the court's ability to
protect such activity.296 The Doe dissent also recognized that Stanley stood for constitu-
tional protection of socially condemned activity having no harmful external effect. 297
And the Baker court saw that the Stanley extension of the privacy right reached private,
voluntary, intimate relationships between homosexuals.298
There is, therefore, a logical framework for challenging the constitutionality of
sodomy laws. Griswold protects intimate activity in the marital relationship; Eisenstadt
extends that protection to those not married; and Stanley protects even those activities
in conflict with traditional mores so long as they are practiced in the home. Within this
analytic structure, the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick299 displayed flawed logic when it
failed to invalidate the Georgia statute.
By claiming that the rights protected in the earlier privacy cases were limited to
family, procreation, and marriage,"u the Court ignored the logical extension provided
by Eisenstadt and Stanley, and presented an analysis that was itself, at best, facetious."'
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion was a gratuitous vehicle used simply to rei-
terate Blackstone's statement that sodomy is a heinous act "the very mention of which is
a disgrace to human nature." 9 ° 2 His opinion added little else in the way of analysis. if
the right of privacy has, in the past, afforded the individual a right to use contracep-
tives, 503 to marry whom one chooses, 3" to have an abortion, 905 and to view pornography
v. Bowers, 750 F.2(1 at 1211; Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1140 (N.D. Texas 1982); and Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting).
293 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Eisenstadt's effect on the
Griswold holding.
294 It is not clear how the Bowers majority made a distinction between heterosexuals and hom-
osexuals. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the majority failed to assume the burden of
justifying a selective application of the law. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens contended that neither a neutral or legitimate interest beyond habitual dislike of a
disfavored group supported such a distinction. Id.
29 ' 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
Y9°
	 760 F,2d at 1212.
297 Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1205 (Merhigc, J., dissenting).
298 Baker, 553 F. Supp. at 1141.
299 106 S. Ct. 284! (1986).
"41 Id. at 2843.
301
 The majority cited Eisenstadt only in passing and characterized it as a case insuring contra-
ceptive freedom. Id. Although Stanley received somewhat more textual attention, the Court dismissed
its effect by claiming it was a decision firmly grounded in the first amendment. Id.
392 Id. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAMES *215).
309 Eisenstadt, 404 U.S. 113.
"4 Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
]95 Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
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in the home,3"6
 it seems capricious not to extend the same constitutional protection to
private sexual conduct between persons of the same gender. If these cases do not support
extending constitutional protection to homosexual conduct, the Court must produce a
reasoned explanation for that conclusion rather than the illogical and emotional opinion
provided in Bowers.
In contrast, Justice Blackmun's Bowers dissent recognized a unifying principle in the
former privacy decisions which the majority refused to address: 3°7
 an interest in individ-
ual liberty that protects both intimate associations and the private activity central to the
fulfillment of personal autonomy." The right of personal autonomy includes the right
to be sexually intimate with a partner of one's own choosing. It encompasses homosexuals
as well as heterosexuals. A well-reasoned Bowers opinion should have addressed this
unifying principle and distinguished the sodomy statute it upheld from the liberty-
infringing statutes invalidated in the Court's earlier decisions. The Bowers opinion failed
to address prior Supreme Court decisions that developed a right of privacy not explicitly
limited to married persons or heterosexuals. Such an omission does violence to a court's
credibility which depends largely upon the reasoning it demonstrates in its written
opinions. 3° Facile analyses impair a court's strongest claim to acceptance: its persuasive-
ness and the clear articulation of its logic.] 1 °
Finally, the majority opinion was insensitive in its refusal to recognize in homosexuals
the same human need for sexual intimacy shared by the heterosexual population. The
opinion only serves to exaggerate the perceived differences between homosexuals and
heterosexuals and further insulate a minority struggling for a sense of dignity.3" This
insensitivity is a sad departure from a Constitution purporting "to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations." 3 12 The central role of
sexuality is the same for all individuals. It provides "the independent status of a profound
ecstasy that makes available to a modern person experiences increasingly inaccessible in
public life: self transcendence, expression of private fantasy, release of inner tensions,
and meaningful and acceptable expression of regressive desires to be again the free child
— unafraid to lose control, playful, vulnerable, spontaneous, sensually loved ...... 313
3" Stanley, 346 U.S. 557.
307 Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
3" Id. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
mg See generally Fuller, supra note 14.
31 ° A judicial decision's distinctive claim to acceptance is the persuasiveness of its logic and
reasoning. Legislatures have their own distinctive claim to acceptance based on their (imperfectly)
representative character and the fact that they are democratically elected. As a result, legislative
enactments do not depend so heavily for legitimization on their innate persuasiveness. The effec-
tiveness of legislation, on the other hand, may be crucially dependent on its persuasiveness and
rationality. Legislatures and courts are good at different things. The former finds social and
economic facts and balances conflicting and competing interests; the latter reasonably elaborates
principle. For a nuanced presentation of this notion, see Ely, Forward: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARV, L. REV. 5 (1978).
311
 As one activist stated: "1 think to love myself in a society that does not want me to do so is
miraculous." Anaiu AND ADAIR, WORD Is OUT 249 (1978). This book is comprised entirely of
interviews with gay people.
312 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
313
 Richards, supra note 9, at 1003-04.
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CONCLUSION
Courts have at their disposal the tools for demonstrating that rights take new forms
and need novel definitions as society evolves. It is not a court's responsibility to create
new rights, but rather to protect preexisting rights which manifest a new expression.
Courts do this by persuasively and logically analogizing to allied rights and extending
them so they take on a new dimension which society recognizes and accepts.
Throughout the cases evincing a right of privacy runs the common thread that the
state cannot interfere with a person's inviolate right to form private consensual intimate
associations. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court ignored the true interests protected by the
right of privacy and, in so doing, betrayed the values it should have protected. As Justice
Blackmun noted in his outstanding dissent, one can only hope that the Court will soon
reconsider its analysis and recognize that depriving individuals of the right to decide
which paths they will follow in their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat
than tolerance of non-conformity ever could do.
JOHN A. GORDON
